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30 December 1963

TS No. 186359/63

**BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR THE DDCI****C O N T E N T S**

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BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR DDCI

SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES

- I. I want to brief for you this morning our latest National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet military capabilities for attack and defense, and then review our present appreciation of the Soviet economy.
- II. We have identified a total of 18 ICBM complexes in the USSR.
  - A. These complexes contain a total of more than 200 ICBM launching pads in various stages of construction. We estimate that on 1 October 120 to 135 of these launch pads were completed and operational with their missiles in place. (The total includes 15 launch positions at the Tyuratam test rangehead.)
  - B. We expect that by mid-1965 this will increase to 250 to 350 launchers for present types of missiles.
  - C. Most of the Soviet launchers are soft sites. We estimate that there were about 20 hardened silos on 1 October, and that by mid-1965 perhaps one third of all sites--75 to 90--will

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be hardened.

D. We believe each of the soft sites probably has a second missile available, but we doubt that the silos have a capability for a second salvo.

III. The principal Soviet ICBM system is the SS-7, comparable to our TITAN II, with storable liquid fuel and inertial guidance.

A. We believe these missiles carry a warhead with a nuclear yield in the low megaton range. Improvements in Soviet nuclear technology resulting from their 1961 and 1962 tests will probably enable them to increase the yields over the next year or two to possibly  
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IV. In addition to the intercontinental missile threat to us, we must consider the enormous intermediate and medium range missile force arrayed against our allies.

A. We have identified about 675 sites in the USSR for the types of offensive missiles the Soviets intended to put in Cuba--the 1,050-mile MRBM and the 2,200-mile IRBM. These missiles have maximum warhead yields in the low megaton range.

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1. We calculate that about 200 of them point at the United Kingdom, and another 160 at West Germany and France.
- V. At present the strategic threat from Soviet submarines is still limited to ballistic and cruise missiles which must be launched from the surface. There are about 70 submarines built or refitted to fire such missiles to a range of 300 to 350 nautical miles.
  - A. The Soviets appear to be working the defects out of their nuclear propulsion system, after a period during which we have seen a number of their nuclear units being towed back to port. One was under the Arctic ice cap in October.
  - B. Development is also well along on a 700-mile ballistic missile for submerged launching, and we must assume work is going forward on the submarine to carry it. Such a system could be operational in the near future.
- VI. Soviet Long Range Aviation now has about 200 heavy bombers and tankers, and nearly 1,000 mediums. The only strategic bomber known to be in production is the BLINDER, a medium bomber with supersonic dash. About 50 of these are in . . .

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operational units.

VII. We conclude that the Soviet Union does not contemplate forces designed to neutralize our strike forces in an initial blow, and is not trying to match us in numbers of delivery vehicles.

- A. The Soviet forces we foresee for 1969 fall far short of what would be needed for any pre-emptive attack that would reduce US retaliation to an acceptable level.
- B. Even now, however, Soviet forces are capable of delivering devastating blows at Europe and North America.
- C. As the Soviet Union continues to harden missile sites and increases its mobile maritime weapons, this capability will grow both in absolute terms and in terms of the striking power that would remain after the Soviet Union itself had been struck.

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BRIEFING NOTES  
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ANTI-MISSILE AND AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

- I. Turning to Soviet defense capabilities, since the mid-1950's the Soviets have assigned a high priority to research and development for a defense against missiles.
  - A. The principal ABM center is a range of 8,500 square miles near Sary Shagan in Central Asia. In the past six years, more than 300 ballistic missiles have been fired into this range. We are almost certain that Sary Shagan, in addition to determining the re-entry characteristics, has fired anti-missile missiles at some of these in attempted intercepts.
  - B. At Leningrad, the Soviets are deploying what we believe to be an ABM system. We have identified three launch complexes, under construction since late 1960. We estimate the full system will not be fully operational before 1965.
  - C. We cannot determine the precise characteristics of this system, but it is probably meant to engage both intercontinental and intermediate missiles. It will have little

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capability against saturation attacks, decoys, or other penetration techniques.

- D. Our conclusion is that in eight years of research the USSR has not found an effective and reliable ABM system. From what we know of the enormous costs of an anti-missile system, we doubt that the Soviet leaders will approve widespread deployment unless they develop a more effective system than anything they now have.

II. Surface-to-air missiles already defend nearly all of the 100 Soviet cities of 200,000 or more population.

- A. We have identified more than 900 sites in the USSR and Eastern Europe for the SA-2, the medium- and high-altitude type deployed in Cuba. In another year the deployment of this system will probably be completed.
- B. The Soviets have also developed a new system, the SA-3, to engage targets at lower altitudes where the SA-2 is ineffective. We estimate that about 80 of these new sites have been deployed, and expect there will be several hundred.

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C. The Soviets carry about 4,500 of their 7,000 fighters in air defense units, but only about one third of these have all-weather capability. The operational fighter force will probably be somewhat reduced as better aircraft types become available.

III. The significant improvement of the Soviet air defense system which is under way will progressively reduce the chances of successful attacks by manned bombers. Successful penetration by an attacking force will therefore require increasingly sophisticated forms, techniques, and systems of attack.

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BRIEFING NOTE  
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THEATER FORCES

- I. In addition to the strategic forces I have already mentioned, the USSR continues to maintain strong ground forces.
  - A. There are probably between 115 and 135 Soviet divisions, about half of them at combat strength, but some only in skeleton form.
    - 1. Even the "combat strength" divisions are considerably smaller than the US ROAD-type division of about 15,000.
    - 2. Soviet combat and logistical support is also extremely austere.
  - B. We believe the 26 Soviet divisions in the forward area--20 in East Germany, 4 in Hungary, and 2 in Poland--would need reinforcement in both men and materiel before they could undertake offensive action against NATO with any hope of success.

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II. Soviet naval forces, except for submarines, have little capability outside coastal waters.

A. We have noted an emphasis on antisubmarine work, however, in response to the POLARIS threat.

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BRIEFING NOTES  
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THE SOVIET ECONOMY

- I. As Khrushchev surveys the state of the Soviet economy today, he must find little to please him in the view.
  - A. The first four years of Khrushchev's leadership, through 1959, were a great success. The New Lands and corn programs gave agriculture its first real lift since 1937, and industry grew reasonably well.
    1. The growth was facilitated by a reduction in military spending and in armed forces personnel.
  - B. But after 1958, industrial growth slowed down. More ominously, the investment growth rate began to slow.
    1. Even industrial investment, which had been growing at nearly 15 percent a year, slowed to around four to five percent.
  - C. We think the blame falls on defense spending.
    1. Between 1959 and 1963, soviet defense spending increased by about one third.

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- D. However, the problem centers less on total spending than on the key critical resources.
- II. The competition between investment and defense for scarce resources has had a marked effect on the growth of the Soviet economy.
  - A. Throughout the decade of the 1950's, the Soviet GNP grew roughly twice as fast as ours. While year-to-year fluctuations were great, the long-run average was close to 6 percent a year.
    - 1. However, the average rate of growth over the last four years has been about 4 percent.
    - 2. For the past two years, the rate of growth has fallen below that of the United States.
  - B. One of the consequences of the economic squeeze has been a slowdown in the extension of Soviet economic aid for foreign countries.
- III. In the rush to develop heavy industry, agriculture has remained a stepchild in the distribution of investment funds.
  - A. In the mid-1950's, the so-called New Lands put more grain into Soviet stomachs, into livestock and into foreign markets.

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B. But now the soil is near exhaustion and its productivity has been used up. The gains of the late 1950's have been wiped out. Per capita food production this year is lower than it has been in recent history, and sizable imports of grain became necessary.

IV. Soviet agriculture and Soviet industry have been unable to produce marketable exports in sufficient quantity to pay for needed imports of Western grain, machinery, equipment, and industrial supplies. These needed imports now have been topped off by the new Soviet requirement for very substantial imports of chemical fertilizer plants over the next few years. Hence the current push for new foreign credits or extended repayment terms.

- A. The effect of all these pressures has been a sharp acceleration in recent months in the drain on Soviet gold reserves.
- B. The estimated gold stock has steadily declined from \$3 billion in 1955 to less than \$2 billion.

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BRIEFING NOTES  
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COMMUNIST CHINA

- I. The Chinese economy is stagnant. The regime cannot feed and clothe its people as well as it did in the 1950's.
  - A. The outlook is bleak for the Chinese people, since there is little chance that production of consumer goods will increase substantially over the next few years.
  - B. This year's grain harvest was only mediocre, chiefly because of prolonged drought in the south and severe flooding in the north.
    1. Current grain output is no higher than it was in 1957. Now, however, the Chinese have 75 million more people to feed. The Chinese are clearly worried over population growth.
    2. Food will have to be imported again in the coming year to maintain present levels of consumption, which are already well below those of 1957. The Chinese have imported five million tons of grain per year since 1961.

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3. The higher priority accorded to agriculture has not helped. Effective agricultural recovery will require a long-term program of sizable investments and technical improvements.

C. Western visitors report that Chinese industry has great technical difficulties, misused labor, and much unused capacity.

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Chinese industry is producing at little better than 1957 levels.

2. If the Chinese are to develop modern, complex industries, they will need to import modern equipment and to obtain technological known-how.

II... Chinese trade with the Soviet bloc dropped more than 65% between 1959 and 1962--from \$2.9 billion to \$1.3 billion. China's trade with the Free World, which consists primarily of food imports by China, now is greater than Peiping's trade with the bloc.

A. The Chinese have been shopping in European and Japanese markets, but aside from their purchases of food grains, they have bought little.

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B. This reluctance to buy indicates both the tight Chinese foreign exchange position and Peiping's indecision in setting long-range planning goals.

III. The attitude of the public in Communist China seems to be one of apathy, and this has spread to the lower levels of the party.

A. The security apparatus and the armed forces remain loyal to the regime, however, and there is still almost no indication of active opposition to the regime.

IV. Communist China's armed forces remain overwhelmingly stronger than those of her neighbors, except the USSR.

A. Modernization has been slowed down drastically, however, by the suspension of Soviet assistance after 1959.

B. Nevertheless, China continues a modest missile development program and is seeking a nuclear capability.

1. We believe a first nuclear test is possible in 1964, but is not likely to come for several years.

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BREIFING NOTES  
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THE SITUATION IN CUBA

- I. Since the Soviet strategic missiles and bombers were withdrawn from Cuba last year, the USSR has transferred to Cuban control all remaining Soviet weapons except the surface-to-air missiles and possibly the FROG tactical rockets.
  - A. Cubans now are present in all elements of the air defense system. By mid-1964 at the latest, they will probably be able to operate the SAM system without Soviet participation except for maintenance.
- II. We believe that only about 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel remain in Cuba, and that this number will remain fairly constant until Cubans complete their SAM training.
  - A. No identifiable Soviet ground combat units remain on the island.
- III. The Cuban military forces constitute an effective deterrent to internal dissidence, and their effectiveness against exile raids and all external threats short of a full-scale invasion probably will increase with time.

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- IV. On the domestic political scene, the Castro regime continues to tighten its grip.
  - A. The confiscation of all remaining private farms larger than 167 acres was decreed on 4 October. Owners of smaller farms are being pushed toward collectivization.
  - B. Labor is being subjected to increasingly stringent controls, such as work norms and longer workweeks, to raise lagging productivity.
- V. Trends in Cuba since Castro's return from the USSR last spring have not been favorable to his interests.
  - A. Prospects for significant economic improvement in the foreseeable future were becoming dim even before Hurricane Flora.
  - B. Living conditions remain drab for the majority of the people. Western observers have sensed growing apathy and hopelessness.
  - C. It is apparent from Castro's speeches that the Soviet Union has made clear that there is a limit to the support which the bloc is willing to give Cuba.
    - 1. The Soviets dislike Castro's sympathy with "Chinese" ideas and thinks his

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A. The large cache of weapons discovered in Venezuela early last month provides the most solid evidence of Cuban support for Latin American subversives to come to light since 1959.

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creased subversive activity in other countries, such as Panama, Guatemala, Peru and Bolivia.

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CYPRUS

- I. Cyprus is tense but the cease-fire was largely effective by 30 December.
  - A. The British military are patrolling the cities but their attempts to incorporate troops from Greek and Turkish garrisons on the island in patrols have been unsuccessful.
  - B. Commonwealth Relations Secretary Sandys has achieved agreement of the top leadership of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to create a neutral zone between lines in Nicosia, to be occupied by British troops.
- II. The outlines of any more lasting political solution are unclear as both Greek and Turkish Cypriots reject a return to the status quo ante.
  - A. Greek Cypriot leaders are demanding constitutional changes which will reduce Turkish Cypriot protection against domination by the Greek majority.
  - B. Turk Cypriots have revived a demand for partition of the island--first proposed in late

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
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1950's. The Turkish Government supports this position.

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III. Turkey is concentrating forces in the Iskenderun area near Cyprus.

- A. Turkey already has a capability for landing at least two battalions of infantry and a parachute company on Cyprus with little warning.
- B. Invasion appears unlikely, however, barring renewal of communal hostilities.
- C. While relations between Athens and Ankara are cool but correct, Turkish invasion in Cyprus would place the Greek Government under heavy public pressure to go to the Greek Cypriots' aid.

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**BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR DDCI**

**THE MIDDLE EAST**

- I. Premier Nasir of Egypt holds firm and unchallenged control at home, but is deeply entangled abroad in his search for Arab unity.
  - A. He is still the leading Arab spokesman, and has just proved it again with a favorable response to his call for an Arab summit meeting.
    1. This is to take place on 13 January to discuss what the Arabs should do about Israel's plans to divert Jordan River water.
  - B. His prestige, however, and his hopes for Arab unity have suffered from his adventure in Yemen, his involvement in the recent fighting between Morocco and Algeria, and the gyrating power struggles in Iraq and Syria.
- II. Yemen has cost Nasir more than 50 million dollars in 16 months, and he still has an estimated 30,000 troops there, seeking to sustain a pro-Egyptian regime.

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- A. There is a military stalemate between the UAR forces in Yemen and the Yemeni royalists. Nasir has rotated some units and billed the departures as withdrawals, but there has been little net reduction.
  - B. Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia, as far as we can tell, has observed his agreement to withhold aid from the royalists, but the mandate for the UN observer mission ends on 4 January. Faysal might agree to extend it. He has been stockpiling arms for the royalists on his side of the border, in case the UN effort breaks down. So far, Faysal is not convinced that the UAR is honoring the agreement.
  - C. Even if the observer mandate expires on 4 January, the UN will probably keep a political presence in Yemen to try to work out a settlement.
- III. Nasir's principal competitor as spokesman for the Arab world is the Baath--the Arab Socialist Revolutionary Party.

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IV. The Baathists in Iraq who overthrew Qasim in February were themselves ousted in November. Ultimate control now rests with the Iraqi Army.

A. Baathists are gradually being eased out of power positions, and the new regime, while it does not appear likely to surrender any sovereignty for union with either Syria or Egypt, is more friendly to Nasir.

V. The Baathists are still in control in Syria, but are shaky from the repercussions of their losses in Iraq. Here too, we may wind up with the army running the country behind a civilian facade.

A. Syrian Baath leaders are at odds and jockeying for control. One faction wants to cooperate with almost any and all elements opposed to Nasir. The more doctrinaire Baathists are opposed to diluting government power.

B. We have considerable reporting on Egyptian activity to support a coup by pro-Nasir elements in Syria, but little indication of the degree of effectiveness of the UAR agents.




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VI. Arab-Israeli relations are becoming tense again as the Israeli project to divert Jordan water ~~years~~ completion.


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B. Nasir has stated publicly that he is reluctant to resume fighting over the Jordan water issue. He will probably urge the Arab summit meeting to consider diplomatic and propaganda measures against Israel. Sabotage may also be attempted.

C. Nasir recognizes that in a conventional war Israel can probably beat any Arab combination. He is attempting to offset this superiority by acquiring a missile capability, but over the next five years we doubt he can deploy more than a few surface-to-surface missiles of doubtful reliability and limited effectiveness.

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**BRIEFING NOTES  
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**SOUTH VIETNAM**

- I. The pace of Communist military activity in South Vietnam has subsided from November's record high, but the Viet Cong are maintaining strong guerrilla pressure on the new government.
  - A. The tempo of Viet Cong activity was rising gradually even before the dramatic guerrilla offensive which followed the overthrow of the Diem government early in November.
  - B. The Communists made significant gains in the delta provinces south of Saigon during the November upsurge.
  - C. The Communist guerrillas, who now total about 20,000-25,000 regulars and 60,000-80,000 irregulars, continue to receive trained cadres and equipment from Hanoi.
- II. The new government is aware of the magnitude of the renewed Viet Cong threat, but is moving slowly while it consolidates its control.
  - A. It is trying to develop new programs to tackle the critical security situation.

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- B. Greater emphasis will be placed on pacifying the delta, where government programs had been overextended. Indefensible static outposts which have immobilized large numbers of government troops are being abandoned to permit greater emphasis on mobile offensive operations.
- C. The government shows some promise of being able to generate greater popular support for the anti-Viet Cong campaign than did the Diem regime.

III. It is nevertheless questionable whether the new government can check the momentum of the Viet Cong insurgency, defeat the guerrilla forces, and roll up their subversive apparatus.

- A. The Viet Cong continue to show the resourcefulness, adaptability, and will which have characterized their nearly continuous guerrilla warfare in Vietnam since 1945.

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